





Much controversy has been generated in
legislative circles over bank and thrift poli-
cies ofdelayingwithdrawal rights or interest
crediton check deposits. In many cases, the
institutions require that the deposit not be
withdrawn for ten tofifteen business days (or
longer) and in some cases interest is fore-
gone over this period. The new interest-
bearing money-market deposit accounts
(MMDA's) and ceiling-free checking
accounts (Super-NOW's) have brought the
issue to the forefront.
Consumers commonly believe thatdelayed
withdrawal rights and foregone interest(i.e.,
delayed accrual) have no logical basis other
than as a means by which institutions some-
howexploit their customers. This thesis is
hard to defend, however, because these
institutions compete with one another for
deposits, and persistent exploitation would
only result in a loss ofbusiness to more
aggressive institutions.
In this Letter, we explain these bank and
thriftpolicies in terms ofthe economic and
technological constraints on clearing
checks. Even in competitive markets, banks
and thrifts mightdelay interest accrual for
two ormore business days beyond the date
ofdeposit and require that funds not be
withdrawn for ten to fifteen business days (or
more). In fact, immediate interest and with-
drawal rights normally would impose a cost
on the institution that itsomehow would
have to recoup through a lower rate of
interest or higher charges associated with
the account.
Delayed interest
A bank maydelay interest payments on
deposits made by check for several days
because it normally takes that long for the
bank to clear the check and receive invest-
ablefunds. When abank accepts acheck for
deposit, it credits the depositor'S account
that night. However, to receive investable
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funds, the bankmustclearthe check in some
combination ofthree possible avenues:
directly with the other bank, through a
correspondent bank Or banks, orthrough the
Federal Reserve System.
In thecase ofdirectcollection against alocal
bank, the collecting bank often receives in-
vestable funds in only one day. But "direct
sends" to distant banks normally are too
slow and costly to be practical. For distant
banks, clearing may occur through a net-
workofcorrespondent banks (i.e., banks
that sell check-clearing services to other
banks) and/or the Federal Reserve System.
Forexample, the collecting bank may send
the check to its local correspondent bank,
which sends the check to the Federal
Reserve for clearing. This process might
take one tothreeormoredays dependingon
the location ofthe collecting and ultimate
payorbanks.
Because ofthe time required to process
paper checks, a bank does not receive com-
pensation until one to three, or possibly
more, days after the dateofdeposit. For this
reason the bank may choose to delay
accrual of intereston the deposit for a com-
parable period oftime. However, as part of
its checking account service policy, the
bank may grant interest (and withdrawal
rights) overnight, especially ifthe deposit is
small and the account is longstanding. Such
practice is commonplace, and amounts to a
customer-initiated loan from the bank to the
depositor.
Delayed withdrawal of funds
Throughout the clearing process, all inter-
bank payments are "provisional," that is,
conditional on the check ultimately being
"good." Thus, the mere fact that the check
clears in perhaps three days does not neces-
sarily end the process: a check may be
"bad." A check must be returned if it is
incorrectlywritten, aforgery, written againstIF~cdl~If@n TI«~~~IfW~
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insufficient funds, or somehow mutilated
in the check-clearing process. Ifsuch a
problem is discovered, which may occur
after the check clears the interbank chan-
nels, the process must subsequently be
"unwound." The check is returned, the
interbank payment is reversed through the
same channels, and thedepositor'sbank has
its funds revoked. At present, this process
can easily take ten to fifteen business days.
In the check-clearing process, therefore,
only the passage oftime beyond some norm
for returned checks tells the collecting bank
that acheck is probably "good." Ifthe bank
allows the depositor to withdraw the funds
(I.e., grants availability) soon after the date
ofdeposit, the bank itself is at risk. Thus,
delayed withdrawal protects the bank from
the credit risk associated with checks.
Again, as part of its normal checking
account services, the bank may grant im-
mediate funds availability, and this practice
is commonplace for small checks and long-
standing accounts.
Interest vs. withdrawal
Payment of interest and allowing with-
drawal offunds each has economic value
both to the depositor and the bank. Interest
payments (or comparable in-kind services)
are an explicittransfer ofwealth, while
assumption ofcredit risks is an implicit
transferofwealth. In assessing theterms ofa
deposit, the two issues of interest accrual
and withdrawal of funds can be separated.
When making deposits, consumers should
ask when they will begin earning interest
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and when they can withdraw the funds. The
customer towhom the terms are unsatis-
factory can seek another bank (or thrift)
that offers preferable terms, or can inquire
about ways ofdepositingfunds otherthan by
paper check.
Some consumer groups have charged that
banksenjoy fifteen days of "float" when
withdrawal rights are delayed for that long,
even though the bank may begin paying
interest at market rates immediately. This
interpretation offloat is incorrect. "Bank
float" arises because ofamismatch between
the time at which a check is posted to a
customer's account and the time at which
the collecting bank or its correspondent
receives investable funds through the clear-
ingprocess. Float has aspecifiCconnotatloii'
that is not necessariIy tied to withdrawal
rights.
Although the conceptofbankfloat is widely
accepted, it has littleeconomic relevance
to today's interest-bearing checking ac-
counts. The key dimension in determining
an economic value associated with "float"
is the time difference between when ade-
positor has access to the valued attributes of
the account and when the bank receives
investable funds. Ifdeposits pay noexplicit
interest (e.g., traditional demand deposits),
then withdrawal rights are the key attribute
because the account is valued largely for
funds availability. In this case, an economic
value associated with "float" would be
marked by the time difference between
when the bank grants withdrawal rights and
when it receives investable funds.
But ifdeposits pay market rates (e.g., the
newMMDA's), the date ofinterest accrual
markscommencement ofthe depositor's
access to the account's economic value
because the account is valued primarily for
its interest payments. Ifthe bank grants
overnightinterestaccrual at market rates but
does not receive investable interbank funds
forthreedays, threedaysofeconomic return
have been granted the depositor despitewhen the accountwas posted orwithdrawal
rights were made available. For interest-
bearing accounts, the accepted concept of
"float" has littleeconomic relevance.
Electronic payments
Deferred interest and availability arise from
the fact that funds transfers and supporting
information flows are slow in a paper-check
payments system. Whilethis system present-
ly is economic for small-dollar payments,
both the funds and confirmations need to
move faster for large-dollar payments.
For payments that are readily automated,
such as recurring social security and salary
payments, computerized transfers through
the automated clearinghouse (ACH) essen-
tially eliminate the problem ofslow paper
checks. For large-dollar payments the
"wire" provides an alternative to paper
checks. The depositor can request the pay-
ing bank to "wire" funds to the collecting
bank, thereby eliminating the paper check.
Electronic notification is sent from the pay-
ing to the collecting bank and interbank
funds are transferred thatday. The collecting
bank receives "good" (investable and irre-
vocable) funds immediately. Moreover,
given the legal nature ofwire transfers, the
collecting bank faces almost no credit risk.
Consequently, the norm is for banksto grant
depositors overnight interest and immediate
availability On such deposits.
legislative debate
Delayed credit has been debated in Federal
and state legislative circles and several '
possible legislative avenues have been con-
sidered. Proposals have been put forth to
require that institutions inform depositors as
to delayed interest accrual and withdrawal
on check deposits and ofthe option ofwire
transfers. Another direction would require
that institutions notdelay interest accrual
beyond the time that ittakes for the bank to
collect the funds. Still another direction
would require further standardization of
interbank check processing and expedited
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interbank acknowledgment ofa check's
being returned.
At face value, all of these proposals have
merit. But the legislative/regulatory ap-
proach seems unnecessarilycumbersomeor
possibly perverse as a solution to delayed
interest and availability. For example, it is
possible that creating legislative/regulatory
standards for interest accrual mightactually
work against many consumers because
banks and thrifts mightdelay interest credits
even On small deposits for which they now
typically grant overnight interest. Moreover,
doesthe consumer wishtobe barraged with
information regarding delayed interest,
delayed withdrawal, and access to the wire
on every deposit?
Although legislative and regulatory devel-
opments may be a partial solution to the
problem, competition among institutions to
provide more attractive services, including
faster interest and withdrawal credits, is the
solution that the marketplace already pro-
vides. Competition fordeposits will force
banks and thrifts toofferattractivecombina-
tions ofinterestaccrual policies, withdrawal
rights, and yields. But since all three at-
tributes impose acost on the institution,
depositors shouId expect more favorable
terms in one area to be traded offagainst less
favorable terms elsewhere. For this reason,
the shift to deregulate marketyields on
accounts has resulted in somewhat tighter
policies on overnight interest and funds
availability.
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Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 163,045 - 296 4,640 2.9
loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 141,657 - 419 4,704 3.4
Commercial and industrial 44,927 - 83 2,668 6.3
Real estate 57,368 49 664 1.2
Loans to individuals 23,586 - 85 265 1.1
Securities loans 2,250 - 115 - 148 - 6.2
U.s. Treasury securities* 7,602 32 1,263 19.9
Othersecurities* 13,786 92 - 1,326 - 8.8
Demand deposits - total# 39,449 - 593 1,817 4.8
Demand deposits - adjusted 26,291 -1,128 222 0.9
Savings dep:>sits - total 62,826 656 32,639 108.1
Time deposits - totaJ# 71,518 - 963 - 20,933 - 22.6
IndiViduals, part. & corp. 63,186 - 851 - 19,460 - 23.5
(large negotiable CD's) 23,728 - 535 - 12,52'0 - 34.5
Weekly Averages
of Daily Finures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (-)
BorrOWings
















oj< Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
Editorial comments maybe addressed totheeditor(GregoryTong)ortotheauthor....Free copies of this and
other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public Information Section,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco94120. Phone (415) 974·2246.